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KEEPING OUR GUNS IN OUR PAST
Logan Youngworth-Wright
I. INTRODUCTION
The Second Amendment protects the right of “the people” to keep and bear arms, 1 and
it has long been considered “the palladium of [all] liberties …. ”2 But for most of America’s
history, the scope of the Second Amendment has been hazed in constitutional mystery. 3 Since
its ratification in 1791, Second Amendment jurisprudence has been deficient at best. 4 Before
2008, the Supreme Court has only directly addressed the scope of the Second Amendment
once5 in United States v. Miller.6 The Miller Court held that the Second Amendment protects
the right to keep arms that are reasonably related to the preservation of the militia. 7 But, the
Miller Court did not rule on whether the Second Amendment protects an individual right or a
collective right to keep and bear arms. 8 More than seventy years after the Supreme Court
decided Miller, the Supreme Court finally answered the fiercely debated question of whether

U.S. C ONST. amend. II. (“A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”)
2
St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 B LACKSTONE ’S COMMENTARIES WITH
NOTES OF REFERENCE T O THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED S TATES
AND OF THE C OMMONWEALTH OF V IRGINIA ed. app. at *300 (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exch. 1996)
(1803).
3
Andrew R. Gould, Comment, The Hidden Second Amendment Framework within the District of Columbia v.
Heller, 62 V AND. L. REV. 1535, 1536 (2009) (explaining the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the Second
Amendment).
4
See generally United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); Miller
v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535 (1894); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1 (1920); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939).
5
Gould, supra note 3, at 1542.
6
Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (holding that the National Firearms Act of 1934 did not infringe on the de fendants’
Second Amendment right to bear arms because there was no evidence to suggest that possession of a sawed off shotgun was reasonably related to the preservation of a well -regulated militia).
7
Gould, supra note 3, at 1543 (summarizing the Supreme Court’s holding in Miller).
8
Id.
1

2

the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms in District of
Columbia v. Heller 9 and McDonald v. City of Chicago. 10
In Heller and McDonald, the Supreme Court announced that the Second Amendment
protects a pre-existing, fundamental 11 “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms
in defense of hearth and home.” 12 But, the Court did not purport to define the entire scope of
the Second Amendment,13 and it did not adopt a standard of review for Second Amendment
challenges, although it did reject both an interest-balancing approach and rational basis review
as the appropriate standards of review. 14 The Court warned that the right to keep and bear
arms is not unlimited, 15 and it left it to future cases to “expound on the historical justifications
for the exceptions”16 to the scope of the Second Amendment. Since Heller and McDonald,
there has been a significant effort to expand the scope of “the people” protected by the Second
Amendment to include persons who have not been traditionally included in the definition of
“the people.”17 The lower courts have been grappling with the Court’s holdings in Heller and
McDonald in an attempt to set limit the scope of the Second Amendment. 18 The lower courts
have consistently resisted the effort to expand the scope of “the people” to include

9

554 U.S. 570 (2008) (5–4 decision).
561 U.S. 742 (2010) (5–4 decision).
11
Id. at 778.
12
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 628 n.27; 633.
15
Id. at 626–27.
16
Id. at 635 (“[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first-in-depth examination of the Second Amendment,
one should not expect it to clarify the entire field …. [T]here will be time enough to expound upon the his torical
justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.”).
17
See generally James Lockhart, Annotation, Construction and Application of United States Supreme Court
Holding in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008), That Second
Amendment Confers Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms to Federal Statues Regulating Firearms and Other
Weapons, 56 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1, 3 (“Since the Heller decision was rendered, a large number of cases have
discussed whether and to what extent it affects the validity of various federal laws affecting firearms and other
weapons including, but not limited to, provisions of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the National Firearms
Act of 1934, portions of which impose restrictions not specifically referred to in the Heller Court’s list of
presumptively valid regulation[s].”).
18
Id.
10

3

undocumented aliens, but recently the Seventh Circuit forfeited. 19 In August 2015, the
Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Meza-Rodriguez,20 held that undocumented aliens are part
of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, and the court granted undocumented
aliens within the territorial jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit the right to keep and bear arms.
The Seventh Circuit’s holding demeans the Supreme Court’s authority as the supreme
interpreter of the Constitution, and it undermines Congress’s plenary power over immigration.
Immigration law is an anomaly to constitutional law—Congress’s plenary power over
immigration is not enumerated in the Constitution, however, it is immune from judicial
review. 21 In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 22 the Supreme Court established Congress’s
plenary power over immigration. The Court explained that Congress derives its plenary
power over immigration from Article I, Section 8, Cl. 2 of the Constitution, which empowers
it “[t]o establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization … throughout the United States …[,]”23
and from the penumbras of its enumerated powers to “declare war, make treaties, suppress
insurrection, repel invasions, regulate foreign commerce, secure republican governments to
the States, and admit subjects of other nations to citizenship….” 24 Justice Field, writing for
a unanimous Court, stated that it is the inherent right of every independent sovereign to
exclude foreigners, and Justice Field explained that if a nation could not regulate its borders
and exclude foreigners then it would be to that extent at the mercy of foreign powers. 25 The

19

See supra text accompanying note 17.
698 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) (2–1 decision), cert. denied, No. 15-7017, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (Apr. 18,
2016) (per curiam).
21
Matthews v. Davis, 426 U.S. 67, 81 n.17 (1976).
22
130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889).
23
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 4 (alterations in original).
24
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889) (explaining that it is
the inherent right of an independent nation to control immigration over its borders).
25
Id. at 603.
20
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United States has absolute power to police its borders, and to regulate aliens within its
territories.26
The Supreme Court has rendered itself powerless to review Congress’s policy
decisions that implicate immigration and naturalization.27 Decisions that directly or indirectly
affect immigration can have detrimental effects on the Nation’s economy, national security,
and national identity, as well as its diplomatic relationships with foreign states. 28 It can also
affect the perceptions and expectations of aliens present in or coming to the United States,
and perceived mistreatment of foreign-nationals present in the United States could lead to
harmful reciprocal treatment of American citizens residing abroad. 29
Acting within its naturalization and immigration powers, Congress may lawfully
distinguish between United States nationals 30 and aliens. 31 The term “alien” includes all
persons who are not citizens or nationals of the United States. 32 The Supreme Court has
recognized Congress’s power to categorize aliens based on their individual relationships with
the United States. 33 Congress may lawfully enact regulations that would be unconstitutional
if applied to citizens, 34 and it may grant different constitutional protections to aliens based on

26

Id.
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 590–91 (1952) (stating that “nothing in the structure of our
Government or the text of our Constitution would warrant judicial review by standards which would require us
to equate our political judgment with that of Congress[,]” and that Reform in this field must be entrusted to the
branches of the Government in control of our international relations and treaty -making powers.”).
28
Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012).
29
Id.
30
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(22) (2014) (defining “national of
the United States”). United States nationals are further divided into citizen-nationals and non-citizen nationals.
Non-citizen nationals owe permanent allegiance to the United States, and have the same rights as United States
citizens. For the purpose of this comment, I will not differentiate between citizen -nationals and non-citizen
nationals because the distinction will not alter or affect the premise of the argument.
31
Matthews v. Davis, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
32
8 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3).
33
Matthews, 426 U.S. at 80 (1976) (“Congress is explicitly empowered to exercise that type of control over
travel across the borders of the United States.”).
34
Id.
27

5

their immigration statuses. 35

But, Congress must treat all individuals with the same

immigration status equally.36
Congress has made it unlawful for an immigrant 37 to enter the United States without
proper admission. 38 The Supreme Court has stated that unlawful status is not a constitutional
irrelevancy because entry into the class is a crime.39 Congress has granted unlawful aliens
less constitutional protections than citizens and aliens lawfully present in the United States,
and it has enacted regulations that more stridently regulate the whereabouts of unlawful
aliens. 40 Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), which prohibits unlawful aliens from
possessing firearms and/or ammunition. 41 Violation of § 922(g)(5) is an aggravated felony, 42
and offenders are criminally and civilly liable, and are removable. 43
In United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 44 the Seventh Circuit split from its sister courts,
and held that unlawful aliens are part of “the people” to whom the right to keep and bear arms
is granted. On November 19, 2015, the government filed a petition for writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court, and on April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision,
denied the government’s petition.45

35

Id.
Id. Inherent in Congress’s power over immigration is its power to exclude and deport certain classes of aliens
based on characteristics Congress deems undesirable, see U.S. ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 291
(1904).
37
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (defining “immigrant”).
38
Id. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (defining “admission”).
39
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (5–4 decision). See also id. at 220 n.19 (rejecting undocumented
aliens as a suspect class, and reasoning that entry into the class is a crime, and stating that undocumente d status
is not a constitutional irrelevancy).
40
See id. at 218–19 (stating that undocumented aliens have been “denied benefits that our society makes
available to citizens and lawful residents”).
41
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(a) (2015).
42
8 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(43)(E)(ii) (categorizing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) as an aggravated felony).
43
Id. at § 1227(a)(2)(iii) (stating that aliens convicted of an aggravated felony are removable). See also id. at
§ 1229a(e)(2) (defining “removable”).
44
698 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) (2–1 decision), cert. denied, No. 15-7017, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (Apr. 18,
2016) (per curiam).
45
Id.
36
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The Seventh Circuit used an interest-balancing approach to include undocumented
aliens in “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, even though the Heller Court
explicitly rejected an interest-balancing approach as the appropriate method for defining the
scope of the Second Amendment. 46 Since the Supreme Court denied certiorari, undocumented
aliens have inconsistent constitutional protections throughout the United States, and their
rights are contingent on their whereabouts. In the territorial jurisdiction of the Seventh
Circuit, undocumented aliens are part of “the people,” and they have the right to keep and
bear arms, but in the rest of the United States, undocumented aliens are not part of “the
people,” and are not protected by the Second Amendment. 47 The Seventh Circuit’s holding
could have detrimental effects on immigration law and constitutional law. The court’s
holding situates the judiciary as the gatekeeper of undocumented aliens’ constitutional rights
in the Seventh Circuit, and as the gatekeeper, the judiciary will eventually usurp Congress’s
plenary power over immigration. The Seventh Circuit’s holding and the Supreme Court’s
decision to deny certiorari “may well be just the first of … [an] unknown number of dominos
to be knocked off the table.” 48

See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 663–35 (2008) (5–4 decision) (rejecting a “judgeempowering interest balancing inquiry”); id. at 634 (stating that “[t]he very enumeration of the right takes out
of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case
basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”). Accord McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,
787 (2010) (5–4 decision) (“In Heller, however, we expressly rejected the argument that the scope of the Second
Amendment right should be determined by judicial interest balancing ….”).
47
Compare United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 698 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015) (2–1 decision) (holding
undocumented aliens are part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment), cert. denied, No. 15-7017,
2016 U.S. LEXIS 2690 (Apr. 18, 2016) (per curiam), with United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th
Cir. 2011) (holding undocumented aliens are not part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 28 (2012), and United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding
undocumented aliens are not part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 58 (2013), and United States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding undocumented
aliens are not part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 28 (2012),
with United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2012) (reserving on whether the undocumented
aliens are part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 289.
48
Heller, 554 U.S. at 680 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
46
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This Comment will argue that undocumented aliens are not part of “the people”
protected by the Second Amendment, and therefore do not have the right to keep and bear
arms. Part II-A will outline the history of the right to keep and bear arms. Part II-B will
explain the Supreme Court’s holdings in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City
of Chicago. Part II-C will briefly explain the circuit split on whether undocumented aliens
are part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, and will analyze the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Meza-Rodriguez. Part III is the legal analysis. Part IIIA will argue that the Supreme Court adopted a historical approach to define the scope of the
Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago, and
it will explain the benefits of using a historical approach to define the scope of the Second
Amendment. Part III-B will interpret the scope of “the people,” and it will conclude that
undocumented aliens are not part of “the people.” Part III-B.1 will expound on the historical
definition of the “the people.” Part III-B.2 will analyze the Supreme Court’s attempts to
define “the people” in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez and District of Columbia v. Heller,
and will then argue that the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago does
not alter the scope of the Second Amendment as it applies to undocumented aliens. Part IIIC will show that the history of the right to keep and bear arms in service to the militia, and
the history of the common law right to keep and bear arms in self-defense excludes
undocumented aliens from claiming a space within the protective scope of the Second
Amendment. Part IV is the conclusion.

II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms

8

The right to keep and bear arms is deeply rooted in history, 49 and the right “has always
been the distinctive privilege of freemen.” 50 The idea that an armed populace is the best
security for a free state derives from the philosophical texts of Ancient Greece and Ancient
Rome. 51 The Founding Fathers relied most heavily on the seventeenth-century English
republican ideas, which were deeply influenced by the writings of Aristotle, Cicero, and
Niccolò Machiavelli.52 The essence of the English republican political thought was that “a
citizenry could rule itself without the paternal guiding hand of a monarch.”

53

English

republicans advocated for an armed populace, and promoted the idea that the power of the
government was limited by the consent of the governed. 54 The Founding Fathers, whether
Federalist or Anti-Federalist, all agreed that an armed citizenry and liberty were inextricably
connected.55
1. The English Duty to Keep and Bear Arms
Before the English Bill of Rights was ratified in 1689, it was an English subject’s duty,
not right, to keep and to be trained in arms so that he could assist in keeping the local peace
and defending the realm. 56 England did not have a professional police force until the
nineteenth-century, and it did not have a standing army until the late seventeenth-century.57
Consequently, all civil and military duties fell into the gentry. An English subject was

49

STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, T HAT EVERY MAN B E ARMED: T HE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL R IGHT loc.
312 (3rd ed. 2013) (ebook).
50
J OHN ORDRONAUX, CONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED S TATES 241 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W.
Johnson & Co., 1891), quoted in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 619 (2008).
51
HALBROOK, supra note 49, at loc. 345.
52
Id. at loc. 328.
53
David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. R EV. 1007, 1020 (1994)
(explaining seventeenth-century English political theories).
54
HALBROOK, supra note 49, at loc. 335.
55
Vandercoy, supra note 53, at 1022.
56
J OYCE LEE MALCOLM , T O KEEP AND B EAR ARMS 1 (photo. reprint 1996) (1994).
57
Id. at 2.

9

expected to defend himself, his family, his property, and his neighbors from domestic and
foreign attacks; to partake in the local peace keeping tasks, such as the “hue and cry” and the
“watch and ward;” to partake in the sheriff’s posse comitatus; 58 and to defend the country
when called into service by the King. 59
The Crown and Parliament reserved the right to enact regulations on the possession
and use of certain weapons, and on the possession and use of firearms by certain classes of
people. 60 The first of many game acts was enacted in 1389, and the game acts were intended
to prevent popular insurrections by disarming certain groups of people.61 Since the beginning
of the Glorious Reformation, Catholic subjects were suspected subversives, and regulations
were enacted to restrict their ability keep and use weapons,62 or to completely disarm them.63
These laws set a precedent that would permit the government to legally deprive all Catholics
of the right to keep and bear arms in the Declaration of Rights.64
After the English Civil War, the last Catholic King of England, James II, ascended the
throne in 1685. 65 James II sought to reinstate Roman Catholicism as the state religion. 66
During his reign, gun control laws were enforced with greater intensity than ever before, the
standing army was enlarged, and the militia was completely eliminated through disuse. 67
James II appointed Catholics to positions at the head of the army, 68 and ordered all non-

58

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 4. The King was the commander-in-chief of the citizen-militia.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 12.
62
Id. All Catholics were prohibited from possessing weapons related to militia service, however it was
presumed that they kept weapons in their homes for self-defense.
63
Vandercoy, supra note 53, at 1015.
64
MALCOLM , supra note 56, at 12.
65
Id. at 96.
66
Id.
67
David. B. Kopel, Courts and Constitution: It Isn’t About Duck Hunting, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1346–47
(1995) (reviewing J OYCE LEE MALCOLM , T O KEEP AND B EAR ARMS (1994)).
68
Vandercoy, supra note 53, at 1017.
59
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government personnel to be disarmed. 69 The British-Anglicans, led by William of Orange,
resisted James II’s efforts to catholicize the state, and William of Orange defeated James II
in 1688 at the conclusion of the Glorious Revolution. 70
2. The English Right to Keep and Bear Arms
In 1689, William III and Mary II signed the Declaration of Rights (enacted by
Parliament as the English Bill of Rights) as a condition to their appointments as King Queen.71
The Declaration narrated James II’s abuses, limited the Crown’s powers, and enumerated the
rights of the subjects. 72 The English Bill of Rights ensured that history would never repeat
itself. 73
The English Bill of Rights prohibited the Crown from establishing and/or maintaining
a standing army without the consent of Parliament. 74 It also granted the Protestant subjects
the right to keep and bear arms as suitable to their conditions, and as allowed by law.75 The
Declaration of Rights only limited the powers of the Crown—it did not limit the powers of
Parliament. 76 Parliament could lawfully restrict the use of firearms by Protestants, but
Parliament could not eliminate their right to keep firearms because possession was protected
as a right. 77 But, the Catholics were barred from claiming the right to keep and bear arms
because the Declaration neglected to grant them the right. 78 Although Catholics were

69

Kopel, supra note 67, at 1347.
Id. at 1348.
71
Vandercoy, supra note 53, at 1017.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 1018–19
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
MALCOLM , supra note 56, at 123.
70
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permitted to keep weapons in their homes for self-defense, contemporaneous legislation
imposed severe restrictions on their ability to keep and use firearms. 79
Parliament intended to grant Protestants an individual right to use arms in self-defense
and a political right to keep and bear arms in service to the militia. 80 The political right was
thought to be the more important of the two rights.81 It was believed that the individual right
to keep and bear arms presupposed the political right, and without the individual right, the
political right was useless.82 The English right to keep and bear arms would be the predecessor
to the Second Amendment to the American Constitution.83
3. The American Right to Keep and Bear Arms
The colonists arriving in the seventeenth century were “men and women steeped in
English laws, English customs, English prejudices, and English habits of mind.” 84 The
American colonists implemented the entire body of the English common law in the New
World, and the colonists inherited “all the rights of natural subjects, as if born and abiding in
England[,]”85 including the right to keep and bear arms. English history, common law and
political ideologies dominated American culture, and continued to do so even after the
colonies declared independence. 86

79

Vandercoy, supra note 53, at 1019.
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
MALCOLM , supra note 56, at 164.
84
Id. at 137.
85
Id. at 138 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted). See also M ALCOLM , supra note 56, at 134
(“The right of individuals to be armed had becomes as the [English] Bill of Rights had claimed it was, an
ancient and indubitable right. It was this heritage the Englishmen took with them to the American colonies and
this heritage which Americans fought to protect in 1775.”).
86
Id. at 138.
80
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The Founding Fathers knew that “[n]othing [was] more certain than the indispensable
necessity of government …. ”87 But, the Founders feared that a central government might
become oppressive, and disarm the people, thereby taking away the people’s only defense
against an oppressive government. The Founding Fathers all agreed that “dependence on the
people, is no doubt, the primary control on the government …[,]”88 and that a citizen-militia
was the “only substitute that can be devised for a standing army, and [it was the] best possible
security against it …. ”89 It was understood across the American political spectrum that if the
newly established constitutional order broke down, then the citizen-militia would disarm the
federal military forces and re-establish order. 90 To preserve the citizen-militia, the Founders
ratified the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Second Amendment
states, “A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of
the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.” 91
The Founders knew that the citizen-militia needed to be composed of the “right sort of
men and [that it must be] used sensibly[,]”92 so that it would not transform into a select-militia
or a standing army. 93 The Founders divided the control over the citizen-militia between the
federal government and the State governments. Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 empowers
Congress,
To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such
Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the
States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the
Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress to the States 94
87

T HE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 8 (John Jay) (Project Gutenberg EText ed., n.d.) (alterations in original).
Id.
89
MALCOLM , supra note 56, at 180 (alteration in original).
90
Id. at 162.
91
CONST. II, amend. II.
92
MALCOLM , supra note 56, at 142 (alterations in original).
93
Patrick Charles, Second Amendment and Individual Militia Rights, 9 GEO. J.L. & P UB. P OL’Y 323, 367 (2011)
[hereinafter Militia Rights] (describing the difference between a well regulated militia and a select militia).
94
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
88
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The states were expected to maintain and train the citizen-militia. 95 The states enacted militia
laws that defined the obligations and qualifications for service. 96 The militia laws excused
and/or excluded certain individuals and classes of people from service. 97 The militia was
compromised of “all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.” 98
When the citizen-militia was called into service, the militiamen were expected to bring their
personal arms, and to join together for the common defense. 99 The militiamen were “civilians
primarily, soldiers on occasion.” 100
B. The Supreme Court Interprets the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller
and McDonald v. City of Chicago
a. District of Columbia v. Heller
Special Police Office Dick Heller challenged three District of Columbia laws that
prohibited and criminalized the possession and registration of handguns kept in the home for
self-defense. 101 The Supreme Court addressed whether the District’s prohibition on handguns
violated Special Police Officer Heller’s Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.102
In a 5–4 decision, 103 the Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right

95

United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 179.
99
Id. It was believed that a citizen-militia was an adequate defense against domestic and foreign attacks, and
that trained soldiers would only be needed on occasion.
100
Id. at 179.
101
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 554, 574–76 (2008) (5–4 decision) (explaining the laws challenged
by Officer Heller). Special Police Officer Heller challenged three firearm regulations. Although there were
minor exceptions to the laws, the laws in effect completely prohibit firearm possession in the home. The
exceptions are not pertinent to the issue before the Court.
102
Id. at 573.
103
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, Justice
Thomas and Justice Alito joined. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in wh ich Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsberg, and Justice Breyer joined. Justice Breyer also filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stevens,
Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg joined. I will briefly mention the dissenting opinions, but the dissents’
interpretations of the Second Amendment are not pertinent to the argument.
96

14

to keep and bear arms that are not related to service in the militia, and it stated that the Second
Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for traditionally lawful purposes. 104
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, identified the core right protected by the Second
Amendment to be an individual right to keep and use a handgun in the home for selfdefense. 105 The Court was careful to note that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms is not unlimited. 106
The Second Amendment naturally divides into two parts—the prefatory clause and the
operative clause. 107 The prefatory clause states, “A well regulated militia, being necessary
to the security of a free state …. ”108 The operative clause states, “the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”109 The Court concluded that the prefatory clause
does not limit the operative clause, and that the prefatory clause merely explains why the right
to keep and bear arms was codified in the Bill of Rights. 110 The operative clause protects an
individual’s private right to keep a handgun in the home for self-defense, and an individual’s
ability to exercise his Second Amendment right is not limited to, or contingent upon, service
in the militia.111
The Court identified “the people” protected by the Second Amendment to be the
individual members of the political community. 112 Justice Scalia 113 quoted the definition of

104

Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.
Id.
106
Id. at 595.
107
Id. at 577.
108
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
109
U.S. CONST. amend. II.
110
Heller, 554 U.S. at 595–600.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 580.
113
Justice Scalia joined the majority in United States v. Verdugo -Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), which held
that the Fourth Amendment does not protect non-citizen, foreign nationals against warrantless searches outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
105

15

“the people” devised by Chief Justice Rehnquist in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.114 In
Verdugo-Urquidez, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated,
“[T]he people” … seems to have been a term of art employed in select parts of the
Constitution .... While this textual exegesis is by no means conclusive, it suggests that
“the people” protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second
Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part
of that community115
Although Justice Scalia quoted the Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people,” he tapered
the scope of “the people” from encompassing the national community to only the political
community.116 Justice Scalia continued his analysis under the presumption “that the Second
Amendment right [can be] exercised individually[,] and [it] belongs to all Americans.” 117
Justice Scalia stated that the Second Amendment, like all constitutional rights, is
enshrined with the scope it was understood to have at the time of its ratification. 118 Justice
Scalia examined the history and meaning of the right to keep and bear arms before and after
the Second Amendment was ratified, and concluded that the Second Amendment protects the
right to keep and bear arms for military and civilian purposes. 119 The Court stated that the
Second Amendment protects the American common law right to keep and bear arms in selfdefense, which the American colonists originally inherited as from the English common law
as English subjects.120 The Court concluded that “the very text of the Second Amendment

Heller, 554 U.S. at 580 (quoting the Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people”).
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (6–3 decision) (alteration in original)
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Id. at 592–95.
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implicitly recognized the pre-existence of the right and declared only that it shall not be
infringed …. [T]his is not a right granted by the Constitution.” 121
In dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the history of the right to keep and bear arms is
the beginning, not the end, of the constitutional inquiry. 122 Justice Breyer explained that an
individual’s ability to keep a loaded handgun in the home for self-defense is a “subsidiary
interest[] that the Second Amendment seeks to serve.” 123 Justice Scalia refuted Justice
Breyer’s claim, and stated that “self-defense had little do to with the right’s codification; it
was the central component of the right itself.” 124
The Heller Court emphasized that, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second
Amendment is not unlimited.”125 The Second Amendment “surely elevates above all other
interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and
home.” 126 Justice Scalia emphasized that “nothing in [the Court’s] opinion should be taken
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, … or [on] laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale
of firearms.” 127 The majority stated that the long-standing prohibitions on the right to keep
and bear arms are constitutional, and that the aforementioned list is merely exemplary, not
exhaustive. 128 The Court failed to explain why the prohibitions are constitutional. Justice
Scalia also noted that precedent does not foreclose the Heller Court’s interpretation of the
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Second Amendment. 129 The Court even stated that its precedent supports its holding because
the Court has only ever upheld limitations on the scope of the Second Amendment that have
been based in the historical understanding of the right to keep and bear arms. 130
The Supreme Court did not identify the applicable standard of review for Second
Amendment challenges.

In dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the majority’s failure to

establish a standard of review, and he proposed that an interest-balancing inquiry should be
applied to Second Amendment challenges. 131

Justice Stevens argued that an interest-

balancing approach would better address the concerns relating to firearms, and he stated that
“the majority’s decision threatens severely to limit the ability of more knowledgeable,
democratically elected officials to deal with gun-related problems.” 132 But, the majority
rejected Justice Stevens’ interest-balancing approach, explaining that it is too “judge
empowering.”133 Justice Scalia also noted that rational basis review is not the appropriate
level of scrutiny to apply to Second Amendment challenges. 134
The Supreme Court stated that modern technological developments do not alter the
scope of an enumerated constitutional rights, 135 and the Second Amendment extends prima
facie to all modern technological developments that fall within the historical understanding
of the right to keep and bear arms. 136 Justice Scalia explained that “[c]onstitutional rights are
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enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them …. ”137
The Court did “not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis of the full scope of the Second
Amendment,” 138 and the Supreme Court left it to future cases to “expound on the historical
justifications for the exceptions [to the Second Amendment] when those exceptions come
before [it].”139
b. McDonald v. City of Chicago
In McDonald v. City of Chicago, 140 the Supreme Court, in a splintered 5–4 decision,141
incorporated the Second Amendment right that was recognized in Heller against the States. 142
Four citizens challenged Chicago’s gun laws that prohibited residents from keeping a handgun
in the home for self-defense. 143 Justice Alito, writing for the plurality, incorporated the
Second Amendment against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 144 Justice Thomas, the majority’s critical fifth vote, concurred in the judgment,
but incorporated the Second Amendment through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 145

The plurality and Justice Thomas reached their respective
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conclusions by analyzing the history of the right to keep and bear arms.146 The McDonald
majority affirmed that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is not unlimited.147
C. The Circuit Court Split on the Scope of the Second Amendment
After the Supreme Court’s rulings in Heller and McDonald, a considerable effort has
been made to expand the scope of the Second Amendment to include undocumented aliens
among “the people” entitled to the right to keep and bear arms. 148 But, the lower courts have
resisted expanding the scope of “the people,” until recently. The Fifth, 149 Fourth, 150 and
Eighth 151 Circuits have held that undocumented aliens are not part of “the people” protected
by the Second Amendment, and the Tenth Circuit reserved on ruling whether undocumented
aliens are part of “the people.” 152 Each of the courts’ respective decisions has been appealed
to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court has denied each petition for writ of certiorari.153

1. United States v. Meza-Rodriguez
In United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 154 the Seventh Circuit, in a 2–1 decision, split
from the Fifth, Fourth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits. Chief Judge Wood, writing for the
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majority, held that undocumented aliens are part of “the people” protected by the Second
Amendment. 155
Just before midnight on August 13, 2013, Milwaukee police officers responded to a
report that there was an armed man at a local bar. The responding officers were not able to
apprehend the man, but they did identify him as Defendant-Appellant, Mariano MezaRodriguez,156 who is a citizen of Mexico 157 unlawfully present in the United States, 158 and who
is a repeat criminal offender. 159 A few hours later, the officers responded to a second report
of a fight at a neighboring bar.160 The officers identified the aggressor at the neighboring bar
as Defendant-Appellant. 161

After a foot chase, the police officers seized Defendant-

Appellant, and found a .22 caliber cartridge on his person. 162 Meza-Rodriguez was charged
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), 163 which makes it an aggravated felony for an
undocumented alien to be in possession of a firearm and/or ammunition.164 The DefendantAppellant plead guilty, 165 and he filed a timey notice of appeal from his conviction, and he
preserved for appeal the issue of whether § 922(g)(5) unconstitutionally burdens his Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms. 166
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The Seventh Circuit first addressed whether the Second Amendment protects unlawful
immigrants.167 The court held that unlawful immigrants are part of “the people” protected by
the Second Amendment.

168

Next, the court addressed whether § 922(g)(5) burdens an

undocumented alien’s right to keep and bear arms.169 The court applied intermediate scrutiny,
and held that § 922(g)(5) does not impermissibly restrict an undocumented alien’s right to
keep and bear arms. 170
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the Heller Court frequently links the “Second
Amendment rights with the notions of ‘law-abiding citizens’ and ‘members of the political
community.’” 171 But, the Seventh Circuit stated that it was reluctant to place weight on the
language in Heller that links the Second Amendment right to law-abiding citizens and
members of the political community because the issue of whether aliens are protected by the
Second Amendment was not the issue before the Supreme Court in Heller.172 Instead, the
Seventh Circuit determined that the Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people” 173 was
controlling. 174 The court reasoned that the Heller Court affirmed the Verdugo-Urquidez
Court’s assertion that the First, Second, and Fourth Amendments protect to the same group
of people,175 and the court noted that interpreting the Second Amendment under the VerdugoUrquidez definition of “the people” is consistent with idea that “the people” has the same

167

Id. at 669.
Id. at 672.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 673. I will not discuss the second issue in great depth because the comment addresses whether
undocumented aliens are within the scope of the Second Amendment, not whether the 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) is
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meaning throughout the Bill of Rights. 176 The Seventh Circuit also relied 177 on Plyler v. Doe,
which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.178 The court concluded that “[i]n the
post-Heller world, … it is now clear that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is no
second-class entitlement, [and the court saw] no principled way to carve out the Second
Amendment and say that unauthorized [aliens] … are excluded”179 from its protections.
The Seventh Circuit then subjected the Second Amendment to a case-by-case analysis,
and it found that Meza-Rodriguez is protected by the Second Amendment because he is a
member of the national community.180 The court first noted that because Defendant-Appellant
is physically present in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, he is protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore entitled to some
constitutional protections.181 The court then decided that Defendant-Appellant is a member
of the national community because he has developed “sufficient connections” to the United
States because had continuously resided in the United States for over twenty years before he
was removed to Mexico; he had developed close relationships with family members and
acquaintances who lived in the United States; he had attended public school in Milwaukee;
and he had sporadically worked while he was present in the United States.182 The court stated
that it “does not dispute that [Defendant-Appellant] has fallen down on the job of performing
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as a responsible member of the community.” 183 Nonetheless, it ruled that DefendantAppellant is a member of the national community, in spite of his “unsavory traits, [which]
includ[es] multiple breaches with the law, failure to file tax returns, and lack of a steady job[]
…. ”184 The Seventh Circuit subjected the Second Amendment to a case-by-case analysis, and
it empowered the judiciary to use its discretion to decide whether or not to grant
undocumented aliens the right to keep and bear arms. 185
The court then applied a level of scrutiny akin to intermediate scrutiny to the
Defendant-Appellant’s Second Amendment challenge. 186 The court held that § 922(g)(5) is
constitutional under the Second Amendment. 187 The court reasoned that Congress has
determined that undocumented aliens are presumptively risky individuals, and it concluded
that preventing undocumented aliens from possessing firearms and ammunition substantially
relates to the government’s important interest in protecting the public against armed
violence. 188
Judge Flaum concurred in the majority’s ruling that § 922(g)(5) is constitutional under
the Second Amendment, but doubted whether the scope of the Second Amendment is so
expansive as to include undocumented aliens. 189 Judge Flaum critiqued the majority’s
reliance on the Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people.” 190 He stated that the VerdugoUrquidez definition of “the people” is “unsettled,” and that “Heller provides considerable
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reason to doubt that an undocumented immigrant can enjoy Second Amendment rights at
all.”191 Judge Flaum stated that the court should have followed the Tenth Circuit, and reserve
on the constitutional question of whether undocumented aliens are part of “the people.”192
On November 19, 2015, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court, and on April 18, 2016, the Supreme Court denied the government’s
petition.193
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Shaping the Future with the Past: The Benefits of Using a Historical Approach to Define
the Scope of the Second Amendment
The Constitution’s endurance rests in its immutability, and its immutability is what
protects the people’s right to define the national identity through the political process. 194
When the judiciary rules on policy issues that concern constitutional rights, the decisions are
final, and the judiciary has usurped the power of the people to define society through the
political process, and “the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers, having, to that extent,
practically resigned their government, into the hands of that eminent tribunal.”195 To avoid a
future where the people are at the mercy of the judiciary, the Constitution must be interpreted
in its original meaning so that the people’s right to define the national identity is preserved.
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In District of Columbia v. Heller,196 the late Justice Scalia, who is regarded as “the
most influential justice of the century” by his fellow Justices,197 preserved the scope of the
Second Amendment in the history of the right to keep and bear arms. Nevertheless, some
historians have questioned and critiqued the Supreme Court’s historical accounts of the right
to keep and bear arms in Heller and McDonald.198 But, it must be noted that historians and
judiciaries have conflicting motivations for studying history—historians seek to reveal the
truth, whereas judiciaries seek to establish a workable jurisprudence based on definitive
answers. 199 Historians look to the past and marvel at the ironies, while judiciaries look to the
past to shape the future. 200 Justice Scalia stated that “the question is not whether [a]
historically focused method is a perfect means of restraining aristocratic judicial Constitution
writing; but whether it is the best means available in an imperfect world.”201
The text and history of the Second Amendment will resolve whether unlawful aliens
are entitled to the Second Amendment right. Defining the scope of the Second Amendment
in the history of the right to keep and bear arms will shield the Second Amendment from
“vague ethico-political First Principles [sic] whose combined conclusion can be found to point
in any direction [a] judge [may] favor[].”202
B. Undocumented Aliens are Not “The People”
1. The History of “The People”
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“The people” is a term of art used in select parts of the Constitution. 203 The Preamble
declares that “the people” ordained and established the Constitution “in order to form a more
perfect union.” 204

“The people” in the Preamble are the same people who declared

independence from Great Britain, and signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776.
The Declaration of Independence was rooted in two principals—human equality and
consent of the governed. 205 According to the principal of equality, all men are created equal,
and all men possess unalienable, natural rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.206
But, natural rights not secure in the natural state of being, and to preserve these rights,
government are established among men, and these government act as the keeper of its people’s
natural rights. 207 The government only protects the natural rights of its citizens, who are the
people who submit to its power, take on civil obligations in return for protection, and who
swear allegiance to it. 208 The government only owes its citizens its complete loyalty and
protection.209
Although the 1787 Constitution did not formally define citizenship, 210 it did empower
Congress “[t]o establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization … throughout the United States ….
”211 During the Founding, the goal of naturalization and immigration was to increase the
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wealth and strength of the United States. 212 Immigrants were welcomed, and even encouraged,
to settle in the United States. 213 But, the Founders were concerned that an open immigration
policy would severely encroach on the development of the United States’ national identity,
and so it limited naturalization citizenship to persons who would “throw their fortunes into a
common lot with ours.” 214 The Naturalization Act of 1790 the first law to define citizenship,
and restrict access to naturalization citizenship.215 The Act of 1790 required, amongst other
things, that a naturalizing alien swear an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the United
States.216 A naturalizing alien was also required to appreciate and understand the principals
of self-governance. 217 Naturalized citizens were granted all the constitutional rights and
protections that were afforded to natural born citizens.
“The Constitution’s protections against governmental abrogation of rights were
reserved for the citizenry; they did not extend to aliens.” 218 The Federalist and Republican
debates illustrate the dispute as to whether non-citizens were entitled to constitutional rights.
The Federalists wanted to limit the constitutional protections afforded to non-citizens, and
they argued that only citizens were entitled to constitutional rights because only citizens
submitted to the power of the government.219 The Jeffersonian-Republicans argued that the
Constitution protected all persons who observed the laws of the land. 220 Eventually, the
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Federalist’s prevailed.

In the late eighteenth-century, the Federalists dominated the 5th

Congress, and it passed the Alien and Seditions Acts, which allowed Congress and the
Executive to stringently regulate immigration and naturalization, and to curtail the
constitutional protections afforded to aliens. 221
The modern idea of American Citizenship did not develop until the Reconstruction,
when the 39th Congress ratified the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.222 The Fourteenth Amendment223 overruled Dred Scott v. Sandford,224 which held that
African Americans were not citizens, and codified the Civil Rights Act of 1866.225 The Civil
Rights Act of 1866 defined citizenship to include “all persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign power … [and declared that] such citizens, of every race and color
… shall have the same right[s] …. ” The Fourteenth Amendment required all citizens, and persons
similarly situated, to be treated equally.226 The Reconstruction Congress did not intend for, nor did
the public believe that, the Fourteenth Amendment required all persons of all legal statuses to be
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treated equally. 227 In NOTES

ON THE

CONSTITUTION

OF THE

UNITED S TATES, William A.

Sutherland summarized the prevailing view of the legal commentators during the
Reconstruction, which was that “the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere in the
least with the exercise of [the police] power that the states …[,]”228 and it was not designed to
tamper with the original scopes of the enumerated constitutional rights. 229
2. Sometimes They’re In; Sometimes They’re Out: Excluding Undocumented Immigrants from
the “The People”
a. The First Attempt to Define “The People:” The Verdugo-Urquidez Definition of “The
People”
Before District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court had only attempted to define
“the people” once before in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. 230 The Verdugo-Urquidez
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the search of a residence located in
Mexico, and owned by a Mexican national who had no voluntary connections to the United
States.231 In its analysis of the scope of the Fourth Amendment, the Court proposed that
“The people” protected by the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second
Amendments, and to whom rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part
of that community232

See e.g., T HE LOYAL GEORGIAN, Feb. 3, 1866, at 3, col. 4 (“We answer certainly you have the same right to
own and carry arms that other citizens have. You are not only free but citizens of the United States and as such
entitled to the same privileges granted to other citizens by the constitution .…”); The Arms Seizure, NEW
ORLEANS P ICAYUNE , Sept. 10, 1874, at 1, col. 4 (“The right of an American citizen to possess and bear arms is
guaranteed to him by the constitution. The right of a merchant to sell and of an individual to buy arms, is
beyond all question.”).
228
W ILLIAM A. SUTHERLAND, NOTES ON THE C ONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED S TATES, 698 (1904). See also,
CORNELL, supra note 199, at loc. 3055 (explaining that legal commentators during the Reconstruction did not
believe that the Fourteenth Amendment altered the scope of the Second Amendment).
229
CORNELL, supra note 199, at loc. 3105.
230
494 U.S. 259 (1990).
231
Id. at 274–75.
232
Id. at 265.
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But, as Justice Brennan noted in dissent, the Court left the “precise contours of its sufficient
connections test unclear[,]” 233 and the Court did not clearly define what constitutes a
“substantial connection.” It merely suggested that voluntary presence in the United States
and/or acceptance of some societal obligations might constitute a “substantial connection.” 234
But, the Court “tempered [its] seemingly alien-friendly approach with the caveat that
constitutional [rights] apply differently to citizens and aliens.” 235
The Verdugo-Urquidez Court also endorsed a uniform reading of “the people”
throughout the Constitution, however a uniform reading of “the people” in the First, Second,
and Fourth Amendments does not necessarily warrant including undocumented aliens in the
definition of “the people.” The Verdugo-Urquidez holding is often wrongly cited as granting
undocumented aliens Fourth Amendment rights, even though the Verdugo-Urquidez Court
explicitly stated that it has never ruled on whether undocumented aliens are protected by the
Fourth Amendment. 236 The Court inferred that the Fourth Amendment does not protect
undocumented aliens present in the United States. 237

233

Id. 244 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See generally id. (majority opinion). See also id. at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court admits that
the people extends beyond the citizenry, but leaves the precise contours of its sufficient connection test
unclear.”).
235
Olesya A. Salnikova, Comment, “The People” of Heller and their Politics: Whether Illegal Aliens Should
have the Right to Bear Arms After United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 103 J. CRIM . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 649
(2013) (explaining the Supreme Court’s holding in Verdugo-Urquidez).
236
See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 272.
The Court of Appeals found some support for its holding in our decision in INS v. Lopez–Mendoza,
468 U.S. 1032, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984), where a majority of Justices assumed that the
Fourth Amendment applied to illegal aliens in the United States. We cannot fault the Court of Appeals
for placing some reliance on the case, but our decision did not expressly address the proposition
gleaned by the court below. The question presented for decision in Lopez –Mendoza was limited to
whether the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule should be extended to civil deportation
proceedings; it did not encompass whether the protections of the Fourth Amendment extend to illegal
aliens in this country. The Court often grants certiorari to decide particular legal issues while assuming
without deciding the validity of antecedent propositions …. Our statements in Lopez-Mendoza are
therefore not dispositive of how the Court would rule on a Fourth Amendment claim by illegal aliens
in the United States if such a claim was squarely before us.
237
Id. at 283 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Undocumented aliens rights under the First Amendment are just as tenuous as their
rights under the Fourth Amendment. Although the Supreme Court has recognized that
“freedom of speech and press is accorded to aliens residing in this country[,]” 238 and that “the
assurance of First Amendment rights is everyone’s concern[,]” 239 the Court has recently
restricted undocumented aliens’ First Amendment rights. In Reno v. American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that undocumented
aliens are entitled to raise selective enforcement defenses under the First Amendment during
removal proceedings. 240

The Court reasoned that “when an alien’s continuing presence in

this country is in violation of the immigration laws, the Government does not offend the
Constitution by deporting him for the additional reason that it believes him to be a member
of an organization that supports terrorist activity.” 241 By depriving undocumented aliens the
constitutional defense, the Court restricted undocumented aliens’ rights under the First
Amendment, and inferred that unlawful aliens do not enjoy the full protections of the First
Amendment. 242 The First and Fourth Amendment jurisprudences do not mandate that
undocumented aliens be included in the definition of “the people,” and it would not be
inconsistent with precedent to exclude them from “the people.”

It may even be more

consistent with precedent to exclude undocumented aliens from “the people.”
b. A Slight of Hand: Narrowing the Scope of “The People” to Exclude Undocumented Aliens
The Heller Court relied on the Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people,” but in a
slight of hand, Justice Scalia restricted the scope of “the people” to include only members of
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Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (alteration in original).
Salnikova, supra note 235, at 649 (quoting Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 282 (1945)).
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REV. 183, 186 (2000)).
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the political community. 243 The Heller definition is controlling because the legitimacy of the
Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people” is questionable, and Heller provides
considerable reason to doubt the validity of the Verdugo-Urquidez definition of “the people.”
In Verdugo-Urquidez, four justices adopted the substantial connections test, and five
justices out rightly rejected it. 244 Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
and Justice Kennedy joined the majority but filed a concurring opinion that rejected Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s interpretation of the scope of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Stevens
rejected the substantial connections test, 245 and stated that Court’s opinion was overly broad,
and that it was not sensible since the issue before the Court was quite narrow. 246 In
concurrence, Justice Kennedy doubted the Court’s definition of “the people.” 247 Justice
Kennedy explained that he “cannot place any weight on the reference to the people in the
Fourth Amendment as a source of restricting its protections …. ” 248 The substantial
connections test survived by only four Justices, and its legality is questionable.249
In Heller, Justice Scalia defined “the people” to include only the members of the
political community. 250 In United States v. Cruikshank, 251 Chief Justice Waite explained that
Citizens are the members of the political community to which they belong. They are
the people who compose the community, and who, in their associated capacity, have
established or submitted themselves to the domain of the government, the people may
confer upon it such powers as they choose.
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, “The People” of the Second Amendment: Citizenship and the Right to Bear Arms ,
85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1536 (2010).
244
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice White, Justice O’Connor, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Kennedy joined. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Justice Stevens filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Marshall
joined; and Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion.
245
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
246
Id. at 279.
247
Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
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Id. at 287 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., majority opinion).
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District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (5–4 decision) (Scalia, J., majority opinion).
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92 U.S. 524, 548 (1875).
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Professor Pratheepan Gulasekaram stated that Justice Scalia, who joined in the VerdugoUrquidez definition of “the people,” was undoubtedly aware that the Verdugo-Urquidez
definition left open the possibility that undocumented immigrants may be included in “the
people.”252 Justice Scalia certainly knew that Heller was the opportune moment to exclude
undocumented aliens from “the people.” The shift may appear to be an insignificant tweak,
or, as one commentator criticized, Justice Scalia’s usual rhetoric, 253 but the constraint placed
on “the people” could have rippling affects on immigration law and constitutional law, and a
Supreme Court Justice would not act so hastily without so intending.
The Heller Court’s definition of “the people” accentuates the narrowness of the
Court’s holding. In dissent, Justice Stevens acknowledged, while criticizing, the Court’s
holding that re-defined “the people” as the members of the political community. 254 Justice
Stevens stated that “when the [majority] finally drills down on the substantive meaning of the
Second Amendment, the Court limits the protected class to law-abiding, responsible
citizens,”255 which, as Justice Stevens argued, contradicts the Court’s affirmation that “the
people” protected by the Second Amendment are the same people protected by the First and
Fourth Amendments. 256

In Six Amendments: How and Why We Should Change the

Constitution, Justice Stevens explains that Justice Scalia went to great lengths to emphasize
the restriction of the Heller holding. Justice Stevens explains that Justice Scalia included the
exemplary list of constitutional prohibitions on firearm possession to the exaggerate the

Gulasekaram, supra note 243, at 1536 (explaining the importance of the Verdugo-Urquidez Court’s
definition of “the people” to understanding Justice Scalia’s definition of “the people” in Heller).
253
Matthew Blair, Comment, Constitutional Cheap Shots: Targeting Undocumented Residents with the Second
Amendment, 9 SETON H ALL C IR. REV. 159, 168 (2012) (“A survey of numerous other majority opinions authored
by Justice Scalia reveals a pattern of similar rhetoric, in which ‘citizen’ does not denote anything other than a
simple inhabitant of the United States.”).
254
Heller, 554 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
255
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
256
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shallowness of the Court’s holding, and to make it apparent that the scope of the Second
Amendment is limited to the scope in which it was enshrined. 257 It is obvious that Justice
Scalia, the chief wordsmith of the Court, 258 intentionally limited the definition of “the
people.” To ignore the Heller definition of “the people,” like the Seventh Circuit did in MezaRodriguez, 259 demeans the Court’s authority as the supreme interpreter of the Constitution,
and it imputes sloppiness into the Supreme Court’s pronouncement of a fundamental right. 260
c. Keeping It the Way It Was and the Way it Is: The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments Do
Not Expand the Scope of the Second Amendment
All governments must govern impartially and justly, and “the concept of equal justice
under [the] law is served by the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process, and [] the
Fourteenth Amendment.” 261 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents the
federal government from denying “any person … life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law …. ”262 The Fourteenth Amendment requires state and local governments to treat all
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John Paul Stevens, J., Six Amendments: Why and How We Should Change the Constitution (2014) (excerpt)
available
at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-five-extra-words-that-can-fix-the-secondamendment/2014/04/11/f8a19578-b8fa-11e3-96ae-f2c36d2b1245_story.html.
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political community,’ those passages do not reflect an attempt to define the term ‘people.’ We are reluctant to
place more weight on these passing references than the Court itself did.”), cert. denied, No. 15-7017, 2016 U.S.
LEXIS 2690 (Apr. 18, 2016) (per curiam) See also Blair, supra note 253, at 169–171 (arguing that Justice
Scalia’s opinions reveal a pattern of rhetoric, in which the use of “citizen” does not mean anything more than
an inhabitant within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States).
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general class of persons to whom all civil rights inure. Such a reading, however, imputes a significant degree
of sloppiness and imprecision into a profound pronouncement on the scope of a fundamental right. In a doctrinal
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persons similarly situated equally. 263

The concept of equal protection is rooted in the

American ideal of justice. 264
i. The Fifth Amendment
The Bill of Rights applies directly to the Federal Government, and Fifth Amendment
protects certain rights of all aliens in the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, whether
lawfully or unlawfully present, from abuses by the federal government. 265 In Graham v.
Connor, the Supreme Court declared that if a constitutional provision guarantees a right, then
an individual cannot claim additional protections of that right under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. 266 When deciding whether undocumented aliens are part of “the
people” protected by the Second Amendment, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. PortilloMunoz, noted that undocumented immigrants cannot look to the Fifth Amendment “as an
additional source of protection for [the] right to keep and bear arms.” 267 Challenges brought
under the Second Amendment must be analyzed under the Second Amendment framework—
not the framework of the Fifth Amendment because the Second Amendment applies directly
to the federal government. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not expand
the scope of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, and therefore, it does not

263

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 288, 242 (1896) (applying the rule of the Equal Protection Clause to
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and stating that the provisions are universal in their applications, and that the
Amendments apply to all persons in the territorial jurisdiction). See also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77
(1976) (“The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these per sons
from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law …. ”).
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See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982); Wong Wing, 163 U.S. 288 (1896).
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490 U.S. 386, 396 (1898) (“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental conduct, that Amendment, not
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634 F.3d 437, 442 n.4 (5th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original). The Fifth Circuit did not reach the merits of
the Defendant-Appellant’s claim that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) violated his substantive due process guarantees
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because the court found that he did not properly preserve the claim
for appeal. See also id. at 442.
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entitle all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States the right to keep and
bear arms.
ii. The Fourteenth Amendment
The Second Amendment is a distinctive privilege of freedom, 268 is fundamentally
necessary for the American system of ordered liberty, 269 and is incorporated against the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.

270

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment protects all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. In
accordance with the modern incorporation doctrine, the Second Amendment should have been
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and should
theoretically entitle all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States the right
to keep and bear arms.271 But, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Supreme Court did not
reach a majority ruling on the method of incorporation.

272

Even though the Second

Amendment is incorporated against the States, the Due Process Clause is not necessarily the
channel for its incorporation.
Justice Alito, writing for the plurality, relied on stare deices, and incorporated the
Second Amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

273

Whereas, Justice Thomas, the critical fifth vote, concurred in the judgment, and incorporated
the Second Amendment through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which protects the privileges and immunities of citizens. 274 The four dissenting
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Justices argued that the Second Amendment should not be incorporated against the States.275
Since neither the plurality opinion nor the concurring opinion is controlling, and because they
are logically opposed, neither the Due Process Clause nor the Privileges or Immunities Clause
are the declared method of incorporation.276
Since neither clause is the declared method of incorporation, the McDonald holding
does not mandate that the Second Amendment protect all persons within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. Although it could be argued that Justice Alito’s method of
incorporation is controlling because it is narrower since it adheres to stare decisis, it could
also be argued that Justice Thomas’s method of incorporation is controlling since it only
requires that the Second Amendment protect citizens and not all the persons within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 277 Justice Thomas’s method does not expand the
scope of the Second Amendment, whereas the plurality’s method expands the Second
Amendment past its original scope.

The failure to reach a majority on the method of

incorporation did not affect the ruling in McDonald because the four challengers were
citizens, and thus entitled to the protections of the Second Amendment regardless of the
method of incorporation. But, the ruling only applies to citizens,278 and therefore, the issue
of whether undocumented aliens are protected by the Second Amendment is not affected by
the Supreme Court’s ruling in McDonald v. City of Chicago.
C. An Exclusive History: The History of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Excludes
Undocumented Aliens from the Protective Scope of the Second Amendment
275

See generally id. (Stevens, J., dissenting opinion) (arguing that neither that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause nor the Due Process Clause should incorporate the Second Amendment); id. (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the neither Privileges or Immunities Clause nor the Due Process Clause should incorporate the
Second Amendment, and advising that the Court’s holding that re moves firearm regulation from the political
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to answer empirical questions).
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In the early seventeenth-century, the American colonies flourished under the guiding
hand of its mother country, Great Britain. The colonists implemented the entire body of the
English common law in the New World, 279 and they inherited all the natural rights of British
subjects as if they were born and residing in England, including the right to keep and bear
arms. 280 The English rights and common law were altered to accommodate life in the New
World,281 but, as Alexis De Tocqueville explained, there was “not an opinion, custom, or law
… which the point of departure [was] not easily explain[ed].”282 In America, the English right
to keep and bear arms expanded past its original scope, and the Founders codified the
expanded right in the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.283
In 1768, the British army intended to foist an oppressive martial law upon the colonies,
and the British army tried to disarm the colonists in an effort to impose the martial system. 284
The colonists refused to comply with the British army’s demands, and they revolted. 285 After
defeating the British soldiers in the American Revolution, the colonies declared independence
in 1776. During the war, the citizen-militia was the public fortitude, and the American victory
reinforced the colonists’ confidence and pride in the citizen-militia, 286 and intensified their
reservations about standing armies. 287
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The Founding Fathers drafted the Second Amendment in response to the widespread
fear towards standing armies. 288 It was believed that if the constitutional checks on the newly
established federal government failed, then the citizen-militia would restore order. 289 The
Second Amendment was ratified to prevent the disarmament of the citizen-militia, and it
implicitly protected the ancient common law right to use arms in self-defense because, as
Alexander Hamilton stated, “the original right of self defense … is paramount to all positive
forms of government.”290 The early Americans did not sharply distinguish between personal
safety and political safety, and therefore, the right to keep and bear arms in service to the
militia and the right to keep and bear arms in self-defense were inextricably linked, but the
two rights were legally distinct.291 The common law right was not contingent upon service in
the militia, but if one was disqualified or excluded from militia service, then he could be
prohibited from exercising his common law right to bear arms in self-defense, and vice versa.
To properly define the scope of the Second Amendment, and to specifically determine
whether undocumented aliens are entitled to the Second Amendment right to keep and bear
arms, the history of the militia right and common law right to keep and bear arms must be
analyzed. Neither the militia right nor the common law right was absolute. Militia laws
defined the scope of the right to keep and bear arms in service to the militia,292 and the common
law defined the scope of the right to keep and bear arms in self-defense. 293 Because “[t]he
Second Amendment codified a pre-existing right, [] it codified a pre-existing understanding
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of that right[,]”294 and the pre-ratification understanding of the right will illuminate the scope
of the Second Amendment, as will post-ratification firearm legislation. The history of the
right to keep and bear arms excludes undocumented aliens from claiming a space within the
protective scope of the Second Amendment.
1. Arming Aliens: Excluding Aliens from the Citizen-Militia
a. The Body Politic
During the early Republic, service in the militia was limited to the body politic.295 The
early American military organization consisted exclusively of citizen-militias that were
maintained by the States, and which were modeled after the English militia system. 296 Each
colony instituted a militia that composed of white males, between the ages of eighteen and
sixty, 297 and who were usually employed as farmers, gentry, tradesman, and yeomen. 298
Control over the militia was localized. 299 Each city, town, or district had its own organization
and hierarchy, and the militiamen elected the officers. 300 The colonial militias served as the
first defense against internal and external threats, and served as the watch and ward in the
communities. 301 The militiamen were required to keep and maintain arms at their own
expense, 302 and were expected to bring their personal arms and ammunition when called into
service.303 In response to the dangers inherent in the New World, some colonial governments
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required all households to keep arms. 304

But, pursuant to public safety, the colonial

governments prohibited certain individuals and groups of people from keeping and using
arms. Indians, African American slaves, and non-naturalized aliens, all of whom where not
citizens, were prohibited from owning arms. 305 Indians, slaves, and non-citizen immigrants
were, like the Catholics in England, a threat to the established order. 306 Some colonies even
disarmed colonists who did not take loyalty oaths, or who did not swear undivided allegiance
to the colonial governments.307
During the American Revolutionary War, all persons, including white male citizens,
were required to pledge their allegiance to the Republic. If a person did not, then he was
stripped of his citizenship and disarmed as to prevent him from fighting against the
Americans, and he could not reclaim his citizenship or weapons until after the State lifted the
banishment. Almost every state by July 4, 1776, enacted Test Acts, which required all male
white citizens to swear allegiance to the commonwealths, to renounce his allegiance to the
British monarchy, and to swear to not act in any way as to injure the independence of his
state. 308 The Test Acts were enacted pursuant to the principal that “in every free state,
allegiance and protection [were] reciprocal.” 309 By the late eighteenth-century, a “zone of
immunity” was created, and the right to keep and bear arms became a “birthright” for persons
who willingly pledged their allegiance to the United States. 310
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Undocumented aliens would undoubtedly be excluded from the Founding era’s citizenmilitia. Undocumented immigrants do not swear allegiance to the United States as to entitle
them to all the privileges and immunities of citizenship, including to the right to keep and
bear arms in defense of the Nation. The United States offers all immigrants coming to the
United States the opportunity to naturalize, but undocumented aliens willfully forego the
opportunity to avail themselves to the full rights and protections of the Constitution.
Undocumented aliens choose to remain loyal to their homeland, and as a result they are
protected under international laws, the laws of the United States, and the laws of their home
countries. The Supreme Court has explained,
Each has been offered naturalization, with all of the rights and privileges of
citizenship, conditioned only upon open and honest assumption of undivided
allegiance to our Government …. He may claim protection against our Government
unavailable to the citizens …. [Undocumented] aliens retain[] immunities from
burden[s] which the citizen[s] must shoulder. By withholding his allegiance from the
United States he leaves outstanding a foreign call on his loyalties which international
law not only permit[s] our Government to recognize [but] … commands [it] to respect
… They cannot, consistent[] with our international commitments, be compelled to take
part in the operations of war directed against their own country. In addition to such
general immunities they may enjoy particular treaty privileges …. 311
Undocumented aliens, unlike citizens, have no urgency to respond to the call of the
government.

The United States cannot compel undocumented aliens to respond to its

demands, and it cannot legally enforce consequences that are consistent with its international
commitments.312
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The Second Amendment was designed to “promote liberty through localism …. ”313
Militiamen served alongside family, friends, neighbors, and fellow churchgoers, 314 but their
first loyalty and duty was to the Nation. Although undocumented aliens may have personal
attachments to people and places within in the country, select personal attachments do not
automatically translate to national fidelity. The Supreme Court explained that undocumented
aliens,
May be personally loyal to the United States, [but] if his nation becomes our enemy
his allegiance prevails over personal preference and makes him also our enemy …. So
long as the alien elects to continue the ambiguity of his allegiance his domain here is
held [in] precarious tenure 315
By virtue of their immigration status, undocumented aliens would be excluded from the
Founding’s citizen-militia.

b. Republican Virtue
The citizen-militia was inherently virtuous because it identified with the citizenry.316
The idea was that because the citizen-militia comprised of the entire gentry, it reflected the
common good and integrity of the populace. 317 As the police force, the militia was expected
to instill civic virtue in society. The citizen-militia internalized the “everyday mindset of
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each militiaman,” 318 and it was a “local institution, bringing together representative Citizens
[sic] to preserve popular values of their society.” 319 Alexander Hamilton explained that the
militiamen were bonded by their loyalty to the Nation and to each other,
Where in the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons,
our brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger can there be
from men who daily mingling with the rest of the countrymen and who participate in
the same feeling sentiments, habits and interests? 320
The citizen-militia was central to American life before and after the Revolution.
The ideal militiaman was a man of republican virtue who was “shaped by his myriad
ties to his community, [which was] the most important for this purpose [of] being [a
militiaman].”321 Militia service was synonymous with integrity, as it was the duty of the
militiamen to “stand apart from the state and correct it when it began to fall into corruption.” 322
Militiamen were required to suppress any self-interest, and refuse all perverted demands.323
Militia service required cooperation among citizens, and participation in self-government. 324
The citizen-militia idealized freedom by self-government through the use of public arms, and
it condemned the promotion of individualized self-interest through the use of private arms.325
Persons deemed “un-virtuous” were stripped of their right to keep and bear arms 326 because
they were a threat to the established order. Laws were enacted to ensure that they remained
permanently disarmed. 327
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Undocumented immigrants, by reason of their unlawful immigration status, are not
“virtuous” citizens, or law-abiding responsible citizens. Although a generalization, Congress
has made an empirical decision that undocumented aliens pose a threat to society and to the
established order. The Second Circuit crafted an appropriate metaphor,
Illegal aliens are aliens who have already violated a law of this country. They are
subject to deportation. Moreover, illegal aliens are those who … [are] likely to
maintain no permanent address in this country, elude detection through an assumed
identity, and–already living outside the law–resort to illegal activities to maintain a
livelihood …. [O]ne seeking to arrange an assassination would be espe cially eager to
hire someone who had little commitment to this nation’s political institutions and who
could disappear afterwards without a trace . . . . 328
Although not all undocumented aliens pose a danger to society and not all are unworthy of
society’s trust, undocumented aliens are already in violation of federal law, and therefore their
unlawful status is not constitutionally irrelevant. 329 Patrick Charles, the recipient of the 2008
Judge John R. Brown Award for his Second Amendment research, stated, “the founders would
have publicly accepted the disarming of [even] recidivist violent misdemeanants who
repeatedly show a disregard for the laws of the community.” 330 In light of the historical
conception of the citizen-militia, unlawful aliens should be excluded from the scope of the
Second Amendment.
2. Shooting Bullets at a Natural Right: The Common Law has limited the Scope of the Natural
Right to Self-Defense
Self-defense is a natural right, and it is common to all persons everywhere. The First
Congress relied heavily on the work of William Blackstone, whose work is still today the
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preeminent legal authority. 331 Blackstone wrote that there were three primary rights, and five
auxiliary rights. 332 The three primary rights are the natural rights to personal security,
personal liberty, and private property. 333 The five auxiliary rights are barriers that protect the
primary rights. 334 Blackstone categorized the right to keep and bear arms as the fifth auxiliary
right. 335
Blackstone accepted the Lockean social contract theory. 336 The social contract theory
requires every person to give up some part of his natural liberty when he enters into a
structured society. Each person must forfeit his “power [to] act[] as [he] thinks fit … in
consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce[,]”337 and he must “conform
to those laws, which the community has thought properly to establish.”338 Once a person
conforms, he becomes a member of the political community and he is granted full
governmental protection. Blackstone thought that men reserved some rights against the
political community, 339 and he believed that constitutional rights were absolute. 340 But,
Blackstone rejected the notion that if the political community violated an individual’s primary
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rights, then the individual had the absolute right to oppose the community. 341 Blackstone
reasoned that if the political community lacked the authority to judge whether an individual’s
rights had been violated, then civil society would cease to exist, and it would revert to the
state of nature.342 Blackstone believed that “civil disobedience is only valid when the public
voice proclaims such resistance as necessary.” 343
Blackstone taught that society must entrust one branch of government as the supreme
sovereign power that “acknowledges no superior [power] upon earth.”344 Since the people
acted through the legislature, Blackstone declared the legislature as the supreme sovereign
power.

The judiciary was the guardian of the people’s rights, which required it to be

“subversive of all government.”345 But, the people’s rights were at the will of the legislature,
and the legislature could lawfully set qualifications and conditions on an individual’s, or
class’s, ability to exercise the rights. 346 Blackstone advised that persons should “have[] arms
for their defense suitable to their condition and degree, and such as allowed by law …. ”347
To Blackstone the right to keep and bear arms was “a public allowance under due restrictions
.… ”348 A man renounced his untrammeled right to self-defense once he left the state of nature
and entered into civil society. 349 Thus, it is the right of a state to regulate the use and
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possession of firearms even if such legislation infringes on a person’s natural right to selfdefense. 350
Henry St. George Tucker, the leading commentator during the Founding, 351 described
the Second Amendment as the “true palladium of liberty.” 352 Tucker identified an individual’s
right to keep and bear arms in self-defense in the common law, rather than in the
Constitution.353 Tucker thought that the right to use arms in self-defense could be lawfully
regulated by legislation and the common law,354 and since the common law had developed
differently in each state, the scope of the right to keep and bear arms varied from state to
state. 355 According to Tucker, there was a legal distinction between weapons kept for militia
service and weapons kept for self-defense, and only militia service weapons enjoyed full
constitutional protections. 356 Weapons kept primarily for individual self-defense were not
constitutionally protected. But, they did enjoy some protections under the common law, but
possession and use of weapons in self-defense were subject to state regulations, 357 and often
completely prohibited. 358
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The Founders believed that to maximize freedom, liberty should be regulated. 359 The
concept of well-regulated liberty is analogous to the modern concept of “ordered liberty.” 360
“Outside a well regulated society governed by the rule of law, liberty was[, and is,] nothing
more than licentiousness and anarchy.” 361 Inherent in the police powers of the states was the
power to regulate the use of firearms in self-defense. 362 The colonies, and then eventually the
states, had the power to define the scope of the common law right to keep and bear arms in
self-defense. 363 The Second Amendment was intended to restrain arbitrary powers—it was
not intended to create arbitrary power by entitling all persons with the right to keep and use a
deadly weapon. Although the States could not completely eliminate the right to use arms in
self-defense, the States could severely limit the right pursuant to public safety. 364 The
common law right to self-defense required “that a person who kills another in his own defense,
should have retreated as far as he conveniently or safely can, to avoid the violence of the
assault, before he turns upon his assailant.” 365
“Self-defense presupposes some means of effectuating that defense.”366 The right to
keep and bear arms is only one method to preserve the natural right to life, liberty, and
property. The natural right to self-defense does not protect the right to use any method
available for self-defense, and it does not protect the right to use arms in self-defense if certain
qualifications are not met. 367 Some critics argue that reserving the Second Amendment right
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to only citizens is illogical, claiming that non-citizens require more self-defense than
citizens.368 But, the right to use arms in self-defense and the natural right to self-defense are
two distinct rights, and should not be confused. Undocumented immigrants are not deprived
of their natural right to self-defense if they are excluded from the scope of the Second
Amendment. There are other means available to defend oneself, and aliens can rely on the
United States government for protection against immediate threats against their persons. The
natural right to self-defense should not be confused with the right to choose a means to
effectuate self-defense. 369 Furthermore, undocumented aliens are not completely prohibited
from using firearms in self-defense. Through the political process, the people, if they so
choose, can grant undocumented aliens a statutory right to keep handguns in their home for
self-defense. But, the Seventh Circuit’s holding prevents the people from choosing whether
undocumented aliens should be granted a statuary right to use firearms in self-defense, and it
ultimately deprives the people of their right to define the national identity of the United States.
IV: CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia stated that the Founding Fathers knew “that societies not only evolve,
they also rot.” 370 If we keep fixing the Constitution to our society’s ideas of fairness and
equality, the Constitution will eventually snap, and it will become nothing more than an old
piece of paper. Inherent in the Constitution is the distinction between citizens and noncitizens, and only citizens are entitled to all the rights and protections of the Constitution. If
courts, like the Seventh Circuit, keep minimizing the difference between citizens and aliens,
then eventually American citizenship will have no value, and the United States will crumble.
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